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The rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion in which a model hand is experienced as
part of one’s own body. In the present study we directly compared the classical illusion,
based on visuotactile stimulation, with a rubber hand illusion based on active and passive
movements. We examined the question of which combinations of sensory and motor cues
are the most potent in inducing the illusion by subjective ratings and an objective measure
(proprioceptive drift). In particular, we were interested in whether the combination of
afferent and efferent signals in active movements results in the same illusion as in the
purely passive modes. Our results show that the illusion is equally strong in all three cases.
This demonstrates that different combinations of sensory input can lead to a very similar
phenomenological experience and indicates that the illusion can be induced by any com-
bination of multisensory information.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-
NC-ND license Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion in which participants experience a fake model hand as being part of their
own body. In the classical version, a rubber hand is placed in front of the participant and synchronous touches are applied to
the rubber hand and the participant’s real hand, which is hidden from view (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, &
Passingham, 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). After a short period, within less than a minute and often as quickly as 10 s
(Ehrsson et al., 2004; Lloyd, 2007), participants start to feel as if the touch they sense originates from the location on the
rubber hand where they see the brush touching the rubber hand, rather than from their real hand. They also start to expe-
rience the feeling that the rubber hand is their own hand (sense of body ownership), a feeling that can be quite vivid in many
participants. The illusion is often explained as a result of the elimination of the initial conﬂict between visual and somato-
sensory representations of the hand and the integration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals, that leads to a coherent
multisensory perception of the model hand as one’s own hand receiving the touches (Ehrsson, 2012; Makin, Holmes, &
Ehrsson, 2008). Because the illusion involves consciously felt changes in ownership of the model hand, it has become a very
popular model system to study issues related to bodily self-consciousness (Blanke, 2012), subjective embodiment (Tsakiris,
2009), and how the brain makes the perceptual distinction between the physical self and the external environment (Ehrsson,
2012; Petkova et al., 2011).4 87126.
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alone rather than by combined tactile and visual stimulation with an external probe, as in the classical version (Dummer,
Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Walsh, Moseley, Taylor,
& Gandevia, 2011). In our version of the moving rubber hand illusion (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012), every time the participant
moves his index ﬁnger, which is hidden from view under a box, the index ﬁnger of a wooden model hand moves synchro-
nously in the same way. This elicits a strong sense of ownership of the model hand and ﬁnger, regardless of whether the
ﬁnger movements are actively produced by the participants or passively by the experimenter. In the case of active move-
ments, the participants also experience a vivid sense of being in voluntary control of the model hand’s actions; that is, they
experience a sense of agency of the model hand (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008). This happens because, unlike in passive
conditions, the participants form motor intentions to move the model hand. Once the predicted sensory consequences of
the movements also match the actual sensory feedback, one experiences the movement as self-produced as opposed to being
produced by an external force (Crapse & Sommer, 2008; Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950). The information related to the sense of
agency can serve as an another source of information for the process of self-recognition, complementing the sense of own-
ership (Gallagher, 2000; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012).
The moving rubber hand illusion raises several important questions. First, one can ask whether movements lead to a
stronger illusion because more channels of sensory information are available than in the classical rubber hand illusion
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). During movement, not only are cutaneous afferents signaling skin stretching engaged (Edin
& Johansson, 1995) but also muscle spindle receptors and joint receptors are engaged (Proske & Gandevia, 2012). None
of these are stimulated by the tactile stimulation used in the classical rubber hand illusion. Second, one can ask whether
efferent signals from the motor commands contribute to the feeling of ownership when the ﬁnger is moved voluntarily.
We know that visual perception is inﬂuenced by efferent copy signals from oculomotor areas, and the possible role of
efferent signals in kinesthesia has been discussed for over a century (Gandevia, Smith, Crawford, Proske, & Taylor,
2006; Matthews, 1982); thus, similar effects on body ownership by efferent signals might be expected. However, these
questions have not been resolved in previous literature. The earlier studies investigating moving rubber hand paradigms
have used different setups and found apparently conﬂicting results when comparing active movements, passive move-
ments and visuotactile stimulation. Tsakiris and colleagues (2006), using a video-screen-based setup, found no difference
in the strength of the proprioceptive drift between conditions in which the illusion was elicited by active movements, pas-
sive movements or visuotactile stimulation. Dummer and colleagues (2009), using whole hand movements, measured the
subjective strength of the illusion and found stronger ratings of ownership during active movements than during passive
movements, but ratings during visuotactile stimulation were again higher than during active movements (in a between-
group design). Finally, Longo and Haggard (2009), using a setup in which a video image of the hand was presented on a
screen, analyzed questionnaire data that revealed a main effect of induction type across active, passive, and visuotactile
stroking conditions, without specifying the exact relationship among the different types. Kammers and colleagues
(2009) also used a video screen based setup to compare proprioceptive drift after active and passive movements and
found that the drift was pronounced when testing using a manual pointing response, but not when using a perceptual
judgment procedure. More recently, Riemer and colleagues (2013) compared active movements and visuotactile stimula-
tion and found equally strong subjective ratings. However, when testing proprioceptive drift with a perceptual judgment
or manual pointing procedure they found that a signiﬁcant proprioceptive drift associated with the moving rubber hand
illusion could only be detected when using the manual pointing procedure. Finally, experiments with fully simulated
moving hands in virtual reality have also been performed (Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010;
Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008) but these do not directly resolve the issues discussed in the
literature.
In our previous study (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012), we systematically manipulated the spatial orientation of the model
hand (aligned with the participant’s hand or rotated 180) and the timing of the visual feedback and somatosensory feedback
(synchronous or asynchronous). This allowed us to show that the moving rubber hand illusion depends on the same tem-
poral congruency and anatomic plausibility rules as the classical rubber hand illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris & Hag-
gard, 2005), that is, that asynchronous feedback or rotating the model hand 180 breaks the illusion of ownership (Kalckert &
Ehrsson, 2012). Moreover, with this design, we were able to dissociate sense of ownership and agency and show that agency
could be experienced for the rotated model hand placed in the anatomically implausible position during which participants
explicitly rejected feeling ownership. Interestingly, we also noted a small but signiﬁcant increase in ownership ratings when
we directly compared active synchronous movements to passive synchronous movements, although no difference was ob-
served in proprioceptive drift measurements. Thus, given the heterogeneity in the methodology and results of earlier studies,
our own included, it is not clear what effect the type of induction has on the rubber hand illusion.
In the present study, we re-examined these questions in experiments where we directly compared the rubber hand illu-
sion as elicited by active movements, passive movements, or visuotactile stimulation. In the ﬁrst experiment, we measured
the subjective experience of ownership of the model hand in the three versions of the rubber hand illusion outlined above
and quantiﬁed the sense of agency in all experimental conditions. In the second experiment, we compared the strength of
the illusion induced by active movements or visuotactile stimulation by measuring changes in the felt position of the par-
ticipant’s real hand using a proprioceptive drift measurement. Our results show that all three modes of inducing the illusion
– active movements, passive movements, and visuotactile stimulation – elicited a similarly strong rubber hand illusion.
Moreover, across individuals, the strength of the ownership illusion was correlated across the three illusion types. These
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correlated afferent signals from many different combinations of sensory channels as opposed to certain signals being more
important than others.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
In Experiment 1, we tested 40 healthy participants (22 females; mean age 25.8 ± SD 5.21, range 18–39), and in Experi-
ment 2, a different group of 20 healthy participants took part (10 females; mean age 26.3 ± SD 4.3, range 19–40). All partic-
ipants were naïve to the purpose of the experiments. All volunteers provided written, informed consent prior to
participation, and no individual exhibited a history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. The Regional Ethical Review
Board of Stockholm approved this study.
2.2. Methods
We used a setup previously described in detail in Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012). This setup consists of a wooden box posi-
tioned on a table with a life-sized model hand placed on top of the box. The participant sits on a chair and places his/her real
hand into the box so that the arm is placed in a relaxed position. A cloth is placed over the participant’s right shoulder to
cover the space between the model hand and the participant, and creates a perspective for the participant that the model
hand is the participant’s own outstretched hand. The index ﬁnger of the model hand and the index ﬁnger of the real hand
are connected mechanically via a light stick attached to ﬁnger caps placed on the two ﬁngers (see Fig. 1A). When the par-
ticipant lifts his or her index ﬁnger, the model index ﬁnger lifts synchronously in the same way (active synchronous
condition). In the passive movement conditions, the participant relaxes the index ﬁnger and the experimenter sitting oppo-
site the box moves the mechanical connection, thereby generating an external force that lifts both the participant’s index
ﬁnger and the index ﬁnger of the model hand (passive synchronous condition). In the asynchronous conditions (active
asynchronous condition and passive asynchronous condition), the mechanical connection between the participant’s index
ﬁnger and the test person’s index ﬁnger is disconnected so that the experimenter can lift the model index ﬁnger with a
temporal delay (approximately half a second) with respect to the participant’s right ﬁnger movement.Fig. 1. (A) Setup with the occluding cloth as used in the experiment. (B–D) Illustration of the three conditions: (B) Active movement: the participant taps
the ﬁnger. (C) Passive movement: the experimenter moves both the rubber hand’s and participant’s ﬁngers by moving the connecting stick. (D) Visuotactile
stimulation: the experimenter strokes both ﬁngers with a small brush.
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: Results of the questionnaire data. We computed a mean score for each category (Ownership, Ownership Control, Agency and Agency
Control). Median values and 95% CI are shown for each rating in the six conditions. When the median rating is equal or greater +1, we interpret this rating to
be agreed and tested for further statistical differences, see Section 3.1.1.
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hand placed on top of the box and the participant’s real hand placed inside the box (see Fig. 1D). Although this vertical
arrangement of hands is a deviation from the classical setup introduced by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), this arrangement
with the rubber hand placed above the hidden real hand has been used previously to induce the illusion (Bekrater-Bodmann,
Foell, Diers, & Flor, 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Heed et al., 2011).
Each trial lasted 90 s. The participant’s task was to either make repetitive index ﬁnger tapping movements with the right
handwhile looking at themodel hand, or remain passive while both the participant’s ﬁnger and the rubber hand’s ﬁnger were
moved passively by the experimenter (i.e., active and passivemovement conditions, respectively), or relax and just look at the
model hand while both the model hand and the participant’s ﬁnger were touched with a short brush stroke (i.e., classical
visuotactile stimulation conditions). The tactile stimulation in the visuotactile stimulation conditions consisted of repetitive
touches applied to the proximal phalanx of the index ﬁnger while the participant saw the rubber hand’s index ﬁnger being
touched at the same place (see Fig. 1D). Both the ﬁnger taps and the brush strokes occurred at approximately 1 Hz, and to
avoid a steady regular rhythm (which is known to produce a slightly weaker illusion), we also included random ‘‘double taps’’
or ‘‘double strokes,’’ where the participant made two quick movements in rapid succession or two very rapid strokes were
delivered. Importantly, the number of sensory or motor events within each 90 s trial (ﬁnger taps in the moving conditions
or brush strokes in the visuotactile conditions) was matched across conditions. In the asynchronous conditions, the model
handmovedwith an approximately 500-ms delay with respect to the participant’s indexmovement (i.e., active asynchronous
and passive asynchronous) or the participant viewed the brush touching the model index ﬁnger with an approximately 500-
ms delay with respect to the tactile stimulation on the participant’s real right index ﬁnger (i.e., visuotactile asynchronous). In
the passive movement conditions, the participant relaxed the index ﬁnger while the experimenter moved both the partici-
pant’s ﬁnger and the model hand’s ﬁnger by pulling the mechanical connections inside the box (see Fig. 1C) that the partic-
ipant could not see (i.e., passive synchronous and passive asynchronous). Between each trial, the participants had an
approximately 30-s rest period to move and stretch the arms and hands to relax. These pauses also served to eliminate
potential carry-over effects between trials because moving and stretching the hand like this eliminates the illusion.
2.2.1. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we quantiﬁed the subjective experience of the illusion using questionnaires. The participants rated their
experience on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 3 (totally disagree) to +3 (totally agree), with 0 indicating ‘‘uncertainty.’’
The experimental design consisted of six different conditions presented in a randomized order. We tested three induction
types: active movements, passive movements, and visuotactile stimulation. We compared each induction type with synchro-
nous feedback (i.e., active synchronous, passive synchronous and visuotactile synchronous) to the corresponding asynchronous
control condition (i.e., active asynchronous, passive asynchronous and visuotactile asynchronous; see above for further details
about the six conditions). After each trial (lasting 90 s, see above), participants completed a questionnaire with three
ownership statements (related to the experience of perceiving the hand as the ‘‘own’’ hand), three agency statements
(related to the experience of voluntary control), three control statements for the ownership statements, and three control
statements for the agency statements. The control statements served as controls for task compliance and suggestibility
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score from the three agency statements. We refer to these average statement scores as the ‘‘ownership rating’’ and ‘‘agency
rating.’’ Similarly, we computed the average scores of the corresponding control statements and refer to them as the ‘‘own-
ership control rating’’ and ‘‘agency control rating.’’ The statements included in the questionnaires were adopted from our pre-
vious experiment (see Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012) and were modiﬁed to apply to both induction types, both movements and
visuotactile stimulation (see Table 1).
To test for the elicitation of the rubber hand illusion, we compared the category of ownership statements and the
category of agency statements to the respective control category of statements for each condition separately (e.g., in
the active synchronous condition, we compared ownership ratings vs. ownership control ratings). We also directly com-
pared the ownership ratings of the synchronous condition to those of the corresponding asynchronous condition (i.e.,
ownership rating of the synchronous active movements vs. ownership rating of the asynchronous active movements).
In the same manner, we directly compared the agency ratings across the synchronous and asynchronous conditions.
Our a priori-deﬁned criterion for experiencing illusory ownership or agency in a given condition was a median group score
on the ownership or agency ratings higher or equal to +1. This requires that the majority of the participants give a positive
rating of the statements for us to conclude successful induction of illusory ownership or sense of agency of the model
hand. The data were tested for normality with a Shapiro–Wilk test (p > .05). For further statistical analysis, we used the
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test for pairwise comparisons and a Friedman test for multiple comparisons be-
tween conditions for the questionnaire data. All tests are reported two-tailed, if not otherwise stated. In the instances
where we had strongly directional hypotheses on the basis of our previous study (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012), we used
one-tailed tests, as clearly indicated in those cases.
2.2.2. Experiment 2
In the second experiment, we tested the degree to which the participants felt their right hand was located closer to the
model hand after the illusion – the so-called ‘‘proprioceptive drift’’ – a commonly used objective measure for the rubber
hand illusion. With their eyes closed, participants pointed before and after each 90-s stimulation period to indicate the felt
position of the right index ﬁnger with their left index ﬁnger. Participants were asked to make a single brisk but accurate
pointing movement by touching a board attached to the side of the model hand box on which the experimenter could mark
the end-point of each pointing movement. The proprioceptive drift in the vertical plane was then calculated by subtracting
the two position measurements from each other (Post-pointing minus Pre-pointing). Positive values indicated an upward
drift in hand position sense towards the model hand.
In this experiment, we compared the two induction types (active movements and visuotactile stimulation) to their
respective asynchronous control conditions, thus having four different conditions (i.e., active synchronous, active asynchro-
nous, visuotactile synchronous and visuotactile asynchronous). We did not include the passive movement condition to avoid
this experiment being too long and because a comparison of active and passive conditions was performed in our earlier
study, demonstrating similar proprioceptive drift (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, see Fig. 7). Each condition was repeated three
times in a pseudo-randomized order (12 trials in total). We calculated an average drift score across the three trials for each
condition and used this score in the statistical analysis. The data were tested for normality (Shapiro–Wilk, p < .05), and the
appropriate parametric or non-parametric tests were used in this analysis. All tests are two-tailed, if not otherwise stated.
3. Results
3.1. Experiment 1: Questionnaire
3.1.1. Ownership and agency in each induction type
3.1.1.1. Ownership and agency during active movements. Participants experienced ownership after the synchronous active
movements (Median: +1.7) but not after the asynchronous active movements (Median: 1.3). This difference was signiﬁcantTable 1
Statements used in the experiment to measure the experience of ownership and agency with their respective control categories.
Ownership 1 I felt as if I was looking at my own hand
2 I felt as if the rubber hand was part of my body
3 I felt as if the rubber hand was my hand
Ownership control 1 It seems as if I had more than one right hand
2 It felt as if I had no longer a right hand, as if my right hand had disappeared
3 I felt as if my real hand was turning rubbery
Agency 1 I felt as if I could cause movements of the rubber hand
2 I felt as if I could control movements of the rubber hand
3 The rubber hand was obeying my will and I can make it move just like I want it
Agency control 1 I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling my will
2 It seemed as if the rubber hand had a will of its own
3 I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling me
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after the synchronous active movements, the ownership statements were rated signiﬁcantly higher than the respective cat-
egory of control statements (ownership rating vs. ownership control rating: z = 4.936, p < .001).
After synchronous active movements, the agency statements were rated signiﬁcantly higher than control statements
(agency rating vs. agency control rating: z = 5.46 p < .001). This was also the case for the asynchronous active movements
(agency rating vs. agency control rating: z = 4.326 p < .001). It is noteworthy that although the participants gave higher rat-
ings of agency in the synchronous condition (Median: +2.7) compared to the asynchronous condition (Median: +1.3) (agency
rating in active synchronous vs. agency rating in active asynchronous: z = 5.127, p < .001), participants still experienced
agency in the asynchronous condition (agency ratingP+1). Taken together, these results show that active and synchronous
movements result in a strong sense of ownership and agency of the model hand.
3.1.1.2. Ownership and agency during passive movements. Participants experienced ownership in the synchronous passive con-
dition (Median: +1.3), but not in the asynchronous passive condition (Median: 2.0). The difference in ownership ratings
between the conditions was signiﬁcant (ownership rating in synchronous passive vs. ownership rating in asynchronous pas-
sive: z = 5.308, p < .001). Additionally, after the synchronous passive condition, participants gave signiﬁcantly higher own-
ership ratings than to the corresponding control category (ownership rating in synchronous passive vs. ownership control
rating synchronous passive: z = 4.560, p < .001). The agency statements were not positively rated in synchronous (Median:
0) or asynchronous movements (Median: 1.0). Thus, after passive and synchronous movements, participants experienced a
sense of ownership of the model hand but not agency.
3.1.1.3. Ownership and agency during visuotactile stimulation. Participants experienced ownership in the visuotactile synchro-
nous condition (Median: +1.7) but not in the asynchronous condition (Median: 2.0), and this difference was signiﬁcant
(ownership rating in visuotactile synchronous vs. ownership rating in visuotactile asynchronous: z = 5.275, p < .001).
The ownership rating of the visuotactile synchronous condition was also signiﬁcantly higher than the ownership control rat-
ing of the same condition (ownership rating vs. ownership control rating: z = 5.308, p < .001). Agency was positively rated
in the synchronous condition (Median: 0.2) or asynchronous condition (Median: 2.0). Thus, as in the case of the passive
movement condition (see above), the participants experienced only a sense of ownership of the model hand but not of
agency.
3.1.1.4. Comparing ownership and agency across the three synchronous conditions. To compare the strength of the rubber hand
illusion across the three induction types, which induce the illusion of ownership, we directly compared the ownership rat-
ings across the active synchronous, passive synchronous and visuotactile synchronous conditions. We found no signiﬁcant
difference in ownership ratings across the three synchronous conditions (Friedmann: v2 = 3.714 (df = 2, n = 40), p = .156).
Likewise, the individual pairwise comparisons were not signiﬁcant (p > .05). Thus, none of the illusion induction types pro-
duced a stronger ownership illusion than any of the others.
Not surprisingly, as agency was experienced only during active movements (see also Longo & Haggard, 2009), we found a
signiﬁcant difference in the agency category ratings across the three induction types (active synchronous, passive synchronous
and visuotactile synchronous) (Friedmann: v2: 51.294, df = 2, n = 40, p < .001). We performed post hoc pairwise comparisons
and found that the active condition was associated with signiﬁcantly stronger agency ratings than the passive condition
(z = 5.127, p < .001), and the same difference was observed with respect to the visuotactile condition (z = 5.446,
p < .001). The passive movement condition and the visuotactile condition did not signiﬁcantly differ (z = 1.141, p = .254).
3.1.2. Correlation of ownership and agency across the three illusion types
3.1.2.1. Correlations of ownership and agency across conditions. Next, we sought to determine whether ownership ratings were
correlated across the three versions of the rubber hand illusion. Such correlations would support the hypothesis that essen-
tially the same illusion was elicited in the three cases. Thus, we ran three correlation analyses in which we related the own-
ership rating of each induction type with each other (active synchronous, passive synchronous, visuotactile synchronous).
We found highly signiﬁcant correlations among all three conditions in the three pairwise comparisons (active synchronous
and passive synchronous: r = .76, n = 40, p < .001; active synchronous and visuotactile synchronous: r = .633, n = 40, p < .001;
passive synchronous and visuotactile synchronous: r = .473, n = 40, p = .002; Spearman); see Fig. 3.
We also investigated whether the agency ratings were correlated across the three synchronous conditions and found (not
surprisingly, as agency was only experienced in the active movement conditions) that there were no signiﬁcant correlations
(active synchronous and passive synchronous: r = .259, n = 40, p = .106; active synchronous and visuotactile synchronous:
r = .054, n = 40, p = .742; passive synchronous and visuotactile synchronous: r = .015, n = 40, p = .928); see Fig. 3.
3.1.2.2. Correlations between ownership and agency. To re-examine the expected systematic relationship between ownership
and agency we observed previously (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012) we also correlated the ownership and agency ratings in each
of the three synchronous conditions eliciting the illusion. Ownership and agency were signiﬁcantly correlated in all
conditions (ownership rating and agency rating during active synchronous: r = .290, n = 40, p = .035; ownership rating and
agency rating in passive synchronous: r = .321, n = 40, p = .022; ownership rating and agency rating in visuotactile
synchronous: r = .538, n = 40, p < .001; Spearman one-tailed). These observations ﬁt with the idea that when one experiences
Fig. 3. Correlations of the ownership (Fig 3a–c, left panel) and agency (Fig. 3d–f, right panel) ratings between synchronous conditions. There are signiﬁcant
correlations between ownership ratings across the three synchronous conditions (a–c), which suggests a similar underlying mechanism. The agency ratings
for the synchronous conditions (d–f) showed no signiﬁcant correlations.
A. Kalckert, H.H. Ehrsson / Consciousness and Cognition 26 (2014) 117–132 123ownership of the model hand, the tendency to report a certain feeling of agency over the model hand automatically increases
(see Section 4); see Fig. 4.
3.1.3. Number of illusion responders
As in previous studies, we counted the number of responders in the synchronous conditions using a cut-off score for the
ownership rating 1 (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2009). Using this approach, we found that in the present
sample, 25 of 40 (63%) participants were classiﬁed as responders during the active synchronous condition, 23 (58%) during
the passive synchronous condition, and 31 (78%) during the visuotactile synchronous condition. Of our participants, 19 (48%)
showed the illusion for all three illusion induction types (i.e., displayed ownership rating 1 in active synchronous, passive
synchronous, and visuotactile synchronous; see Fig. 5 for further information).
Based on this classiﬁcation, we performed a McNemar test to determine whether there were signiﬁcant differences in the
number of illusion responders between conditions. This analysis did not show any signiﬁcant difference between the active
synchronous and passive synchronous conditions (n = 40, p = .727), nor between the active synchronous and visuotactile
synchronous conditions (n = 40, p = .109), but there was a signiﬁcant difference in the number of responders between the
passive synchronous and visuotactile synchronous conditions (n = 40, p = .039).
Fig. 4. Correlations between ownership and agency ratings: we correlated the ownership and agency ratings of the three synchronous conditions and found
signiﬁcant correlations in all three induction types.
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Fig. 5. Venn diagram illustrating the distribution of illusion responders in the visuotactile synchronous, active synchronous and passive synchronous
condition: when the ownership rating is 1, we categorized the participant as an ‘‘illusion responder’’: the majority of participants (n = 40) experience the
illusion, but interindividual differences can also be observed; 48% (=19) experience the illusion of ownership in all three synchronous conditions.
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chronous conditions). Using the same logic that we used to classify people as ‘‘responders’’ we classiﬁed participants as
‘‘rejecters’’, when they showed an ownership rating 1, only ﬁve participants have no illusion of ownership in the active
synchronous condition, only three in the passive synchronous condition, and only ﬁve in the visuotactile synchronous
condition.
3.2. Experiment 2: Proprioceptive drift
3.2.1. Proprioceptive drift in active movement vs. visuotactile stimulation
We observed a signiﬁcant difference between the active synchronous and active asynchronous conditions (t = 3.406,
df = 19, p = .003). Similarly, we also observed a signiﬁcant difference between visuotactile synchronous and visuotactile
asynchronous (z = 2.501, p = .012). Thus, as can be seen in Fig. 6, both active movements and visuotactile stroking produced
a signiﬁcant proprioceptive drift towards the model hand, providing objective evidence of the ownership illusion. We also
compared the two synchronous illusion conditions and found no signiﬁcant difference (t = .591, df = 19, p = .561). Thus,
proprioceptive drift is similarly strong for both active movements and visuotactile stimulation.
3.2.2. Questionnaire
After the proprioceptive drift experiment, the participants also repeated the four conditions (i.e., active synchronous, active
asynchronous, visuotactile synchronous and visuotactile asynchronous) and ﬁlled in the questionnaire after each condition to
measure the subjective strength of the illusion.We performed the same analysis on the questionnaire data as described above
for Experiment 1 (see Section 3.1.). The purpose was to obtain subjective data to use in the correlation analysis with the
proprioceptive drift data.Fig. 6. Proprioceptive drift data. A signiﬁcant positive drift towards the rubber hand was observed in the active synchronous and visuotactile synchronous
conditions. There was no signiﬁcant difference in the degree of proprioceptive drift between these two synchronous conditions, which suggests an equally
strong illusion in these two conditions. Error bars show +1SE.
Fig. 7. In the active synchronous condition, proprioceptive drift showed a statistical trend toward a correlation with ownership ratings. In the visuotactile
synchronous condition, this correlation was signiﬁcant. Proprioceptive drift showed no signiﬁcant correlation to ownership ratings in any of the
asynchronous conditions.
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enced during active synchronous and visuotactile synchronous conditions, but not during the asynchronous control condi-
tions. In the active synchronous condition, the ownership rating was rated signiﬁcantly higher than the ownership control
rating (Z = 3.748, p < .001). The ownership rating in the active synchronous condition was also signiﬁcantly higher than the
ownership rating in the active asynchronous condition (Z = 3.315, p = .001). In the visuotactile synchronous condition, the
ownership rating was signiﬁcantly higher than the ownership control ratings for the same condition (Z = 3.768, p < .001).
The ownership rating in this visuotactile condition was also signiﬁcantly higher than the ownership ratings in the visuotac-
tile asynchronous condition (Z = 3.522, p < .001). Agency was experienced only in the active movement conditions, with
higher ratings during active synchronous than during active asynchronous movements (Z = 2.281, p = .023). In the active
synchronous condition, the agency rating was signiﬁcantly higher than the agency control rating in the same condition
(Z = 3.928, p < .001). As in Experiment 1, the agency rating in the active asynchronous condition was higher than +1 and
was signiﬁcantly higher than the agency control rating in the same condition (Z = 3.310, p = .001). In sum, these results
are similar to the results obtained with fully naïve participants in Experiment 1 (compare Table 2) and are in line with
our previous observations (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Furthermore, this shows that we can use the subjective data collected
after the proprioceptive drift experiment to look for correlations between questionnaire items and the proprioceptive drift
data (see below).
3.2.3. Correlations between proprioceptive drift and ownership ratings
Finally, we tested for the hypothesized correlations between the proprioceptive drift towards the model hand and the
questionnaire reports of ownership for each of the two versions of the illusion. We also looked for correlations between pro-
prioceptive drift and the agency ratings, although we did not to expect to ﬁnd a relationship (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). In
the active synchronous condition, the proprioceptive drift showed a statistical trend for correlation with the ownership rat-
ings (Spearman: r = .356, n = 20, p = .062, one-tailed), which is in line with the signiﬁcant correlation we reported in our pre-
vious study (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). In the visuotactile synchronous condition, drift was signiﬁcantly correlated to
ownership rating (Spearman: r = .580, n = 20, p = .004, one-tailed) (see Fig. 7), in line with many earlier studies on the clas-
sical rubber hand illusion. There was no such correlation between the ownership rating and the proprioceptive drift in the
Table 2
Overview of the rating results: Participants experienced the illusion of ownership in all three synchronous conditions (1), whereas agency was only
experienced in the active movement conditions. None of the control ratings were positively rated in any of the conditions. Median values in bold.
Synchronous asynchronous
Ownership Ownership Control Agency Agency Control Ownership Ownership Control Agency Agency Control
Active movement
Median 1.7 0.8 2.7 2.5 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.3
Quartiles 25 0.0 2.3 1.7 3.0 2.7 2.7 0.4 2.6
75 2.7 0.1 3.0 1.3 0.9 0.0 2.3 0.7
Passive movement
Median 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.2
Quartiles 25 0.7 1.9 1.3 1.9 2.7 2.6 2.0 2.0
75 2.3 0.0 1.8 1.3 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.3
Visuotactile
Median 1.7 1.0 0.2 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.0
Quartiles 25 1.0 1.7 1.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.0
75 2.3 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0
Table 3
Results of the subjective data from the questionnaire conducted after the proprioceptive drift test procedures of Experiment 2. The results are very similar to
the results of Experiment 1; see Table 2. Median values in bold.
Synchronous Asynchronous
Ownership Ownership control Agency Agency control Ownership Ownership control Agency Agency control
Active movement
Median 1.2 1.3 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.2 1.5
Quartiles 25 0.0 2.3 1.3 3.0 2.3 2.7 0.7 2.6
75 2.2 0.3 2.6 1.3 0.6 0.8 1.7 0.8
Visuotactile
Median 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.8 0.8
Quartiles 25 0.1 2.3 1.0 2.7 2.6 3.0 2.3 3.0
75 2.7 0.0 1.3 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.0
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all one-tailed, not shown).
For agency, as we expected and in agreement with our earlier study (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012), we did not ﬁnd a corre-
lation between the agency ratings and the proprioceptive drift, either in the active synchronous condition (Spearman:
r = .172, n = 20, p = .234, one-tailed) or in the visuotactile synchronous condition (Spearman: r = .292, n = 20, p = .106,
one-tailed). Similarly we found no correlation between the agency ratings and the drift in the visuotactile asynchronous
condition: r = .091, n = 20, p = .352; one-tailed, not shown). Unexpectedly we found a statistical trend for the active asyn-
chronous condition (r = .373, n = 20, p = .052, one-tailed), which is in contrast to our previous observations and for which
we have no explanation.
4. Discussion
In the present study, we found that participants experienced the rubber hand illusion irrespective of whether it was elic-
ited by active or passive index ﬁnger movements or by brushstrokes applied to the ﬁngers. The number of participants expe-
riencing the illusion was similar in three versions. The strength of the illusion, as rated in the questionnaires, was not
signiﬁcantly different and was correlated across the different illusion paradigms. Similarly, proprioceptive drift was equally
strong in the active movement and the classical version of the paradigm. These observations suggest that essentially the
same illusion was elicited in the three versions of the rubber hand illusion. This suggests that different types of somatosen-
sory and visual information can be combined to elicit the same changes in ownership perceptions. Moreover, the observation
that the active movements did not further enhance the illusion speaks against the hypothesis that efferent signals associated
with the voluntary motor commands play a signiﬁcant role in the ownership feelings during the rubber hand illusion. Finally,
we observed that questionnaire ratings of ownership and agency were correlated across individuals, even in the passive ver-
sions (passive movement and visuotactile) of the illusion. This result suggests that ownership modulates agency and, in the
absence of voluntary motor commands and intentions, produces a weak tendency for agency, even in the passive conditions.
When comparing the strength of the illusion in the three conditions, we did not observe a signiﬁcant difference in the
subjective ratings of ownership, nor did we observe any differences in the proprioceptive drift between the active move-
ments and the classical version tested here. The latter observation is in line with Tsakiris and colleagues’ ﬁnding of no
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and passive movement conditions (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). In line with these observations and consistent with the
present questionnaire results, the recent study by Riemer, Kleinböhl, Hölzl, & Trojan, 2013 also found no differences in
the subjective strength of the ownership illusion (albeit they observed relatively low ratings overall) when induced by active
movements or visuotactile stimulation. However, the study by Riemer and colleagues found that the proprioceptive drift was
stronger for the actively moving rubber hand illusion compared to the classical version, when tested with a manual pointing
procedure similar to the present one. Dummer and colleagues (Dummer et al., 2009) found higher ownership ratings for the
active movement condition compared to the passive condition, which could be due to the particular design of the study
which used a between-group comparison and was therefore subject to potential individual differences. In a previous study,
we also observed indications of higher ownership ratings during active movements (average score of 2.12 on the seven-point
Likert scale) compared to passive movements (average score of 1.57) (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). In direct contrast with this
observation, Walsh and colleagues (Walsh et al., 2011) found even higher ratings in the passive condition than in the active
one. Thus, the picture that emerges from the earlier literature and the present data is that active and passive movements
elicit equally vivid rubber hand illusions, and this illusion is as vivid as the classical version induced by stroking. These ﬁnd-
ings do not support the notion that efferent signals or efference copy mechanisms play an important role in the ownership
illusion (in contrast to agency).
The differences in the earlier literature might reﬂect an inherent difﬁculty in measuring the illusion. Despite the fact that
the illusion is vivid and can be readily demonstrated in classrooms and to the general public, the question of how best to
quantify it in laboratory settings has not been fully settled. However, there is more or less a consensus in the ﬁeld that sub-
jective ratings should be complemented with an objective measure, and the most commonly used measures are propriocep-
tive drift (as used in the present study) or the skin conductance response elicited by threatening or injuring the rubber hand
(Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008), but see also recent inves-
tigations in using other objective measures such as the cross-modal congruency task (Zopf, Savage, & Williams, 2009, 2013).
The recent critique of proprioceptive drift as a single measure of the illusion (Holle, McLatchie, Maurer, &Ward, 2011; Rohde,
Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011), see also (Holmes & Spence, 2005), highlights the importance of complementary measures to assess
the presence of the illusion. The concern is that proprioceptive drift is not always related to the illusion but can occur in sit-
uations in which the subjective illusion is abolished, such as when the rubber hand is presented to the participant in the 180
rotated position (Holle et al., 2011) or in the asynchronous condition (Rohde et al., 2011). Thus, the divergent results ob-
served in the earlier studies may partly relate to the measures used in different studies (questionnaires, drift measurement
using different test procedures), adding to differences in the setups and types of ﬁnger or hand movements employed (such
as full hand movements vs. ﬁnger movements or real model hand vs. recorded hand on a computer screen). As already men-
tioned, some groups used only the drift measure (Kammers, Longo, Tsakiris, Dijkerman, & Haggard, 2009; Tsakiris et al.,
2006), some only questionnaires (Dummer et al., 2009; Longo & Haggard, 2009) and some employed both but obtained
somewhat discrepant results across the two measures (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Riemer et al., 2013). For example, Riemer
et al. (2013) found that proprioceptive drift was stronger for the moving rubber hand illusion than the classical version, but
only when drift was measured using a manual pointing procedure, and not when it was assessed with a perceptual judgment
procedure. The latter is in line with the observations made by Tsakiris and colleagues who introduced the perceptual judg-
ment approach to measure drift (Tsakiris et al., 2006). However the former ﬁnding by Riemer and colleagues (2013) of great-
er drift after their active movement condition as assessed with the manual pointing response is in apparent direct contrast
with the present results. A difference in results between these studies may be due to the different procedures used: Kam-
mers and colleagues (2009) inferred the proprioceptive drift from a pointing movement performed towards an external tar-
get using the illusion-affected hand. Thus the participants performed a goal-directed hand action with their affected hand,
which is quite different from the inter-manual pointing task employed in the present study. The drift procedure of Riemer,
Kleinböhl, Hölzl, and Trojan (2013) is more similar to the one we used in the present study, where participants used their
unaffected left hand to point towards the location of their occluded (illusion-affected) right hand. However, in contrast to
our study, they compared the individual pointing performances after each illusion induction trial to a baseline measurement
obtained before the main experiment, whereas we compared pointing performance before and after each illusion induction
trial individually, which in our opinion produces more reliable results. In sum, the present data suggests that both the mov-
ing and classical rubber hand illusion result in a similar pointing bias towards the rubber hand, which is in line with the
questionnaire result of similar subjective experience of the illusions.
The strongest results are clearly those that are obtained by consistently using multiple measures, as in the present study
in which a coherent picture emerges from the questionnaire and drift data. Moreover, in defense of the proprioceptive drift
measure, we observed signiﬁcant correlations between proprioceptive drift and the subjective strength of the illusion when
stimulation occurred synchronously but not when it was delivered asynchronously. Similar correlations between drift and
questionnaire ratings have been described before (Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2012; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Kalckert & Ehrs-
son, 2012; Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008). Thus, the detection of visuotactile synchrony leading to a
sensation of ownership may drive the recalibration of proprioceptive information towards the visually observed hand (Bot-
vinick & Cohen, 1998; Makin et al., 2008). That is, drift arises as a consequence of the illusion and can thus be used as an
indirect measure of the illusion.
It is interesting to note that, unlike ownership, there seems to be no relationship between proprioceptive drift and sense
of agency. Thus, in the presence of an illusory feeling of ownership of the rubber hand, proprioceptive drift can be expected,
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sense of agency can develop related to not only a bodily action but also to distant effects in the external world (Sato &
Yasuda, 2005). Considering that agency can be experienced over events in the external world, it makes sense that a recali-
bration of the perceived position of the body does not need to be triggered by agency sensations in general. Further support
for this hypothesis comes from our previous study where we dissociated sense of ownership and agency by manipulating the
position of the rubber hand (aligned vs. rotated). A 180 rotation eliminates the ownership illusion but not sense of agency.
Indeed, we observed a proprioceptive drift only in the aligned position (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Similarly, Longo and
colleagues found no correlation between drift and the subjective experience of agency, but found a correlation of drift
and ownership (Longo et al., 2008).
It is interesting to consider the ﬁnding of equally strong illusions in the three versions of the rubber hand illusion in rela-
tion to the different sensory modalities involved in each paradigm. In the classic rubber hand illusion, only tactile and visual
information is available from the object touching the hand and the hand itself. In the passively moving rubber hand illusion,
information from skin receptors, muscle spindles, joint receptors and visual feedback provide kinesthetic information (Edin
& Abbs, 1991; Edin & Johansson, 1995; Goodwin, McCloskey, & Matthews, 1972; Proske & Gandevia, 2012). During the active
moving rubber hand illusion, this is accompanied by efferent information from voluntary motor commands and the central
sensory predictions they produce (i.e., efference copy mechanism) (Bays & Wolpert, 2006; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000).
Despite these differences in available sensory and motor information between the three induction types, a very similar illu-
sion was triggered. This suggests that the rubber hand illusion does not depend on speciﬁc types of sensory signals, such as
vision or proprioceptive afferents, but that it is the spatiotemporal relationship of the available signals that matters (Ehrsson,
2012). Ehrsson, Holmes, and Passingham (2005) have shown that vision can be eliminated in this illusion by blindfolding the
participant and instead letting the participant touch a rubber hand using the left index ﬁnger while he or she feels a touch on
their own right hand at the corresponding location. In this ‘‘somatic version’’ of the rubber hand illusion, the participant thus
experiences touching his or her own right hand directly with the left hand when in fact he or she is touching a rubber hand
and being touched by the experimenter (Aimola Davies, White, Thew, Aimola, & Davies, 2010; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Petkova,
Zetterberg, & Ehrsson, 2012). Finally, Walsh and colleagues (Walsh et al., 2011) used a rubber hand illusion based on
movements and anaesthetized the ﬁnger with lidocaine, thus eliminating the somatosensory information from the
superﬁcial skin. Nevertheless, in this situation where only proprioceptive and visual information is available, participants
have an illusion of ownership and experience the rubber hand as part of their own body. Thus, very different types of sensory
feedback can trigger the illusion, but correlated visual and tactile stimulation of an external object moving in peripersonal
space is not necessary to trigger the illusion. Matching feedback from ﬁnger movements is equally efﬁcient in eliciting the
illusion.
Most of our participants experienced the illusion in the moving (63%) and/or classical visuotactile rubber hand illusion
(78%) during synchronous conditions. There were no signiﬁcant differences in the proportion of participants that experi-
enced or denied the illusion in the three paradigms tested. These numbers are consistent with earlier studies of the clas-
sical rubber hand illusion reporting that approximately 70% of participants experience the illusion of ownership (Ehrsson,
2012; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Lloyd, 2007) and with our previous moving rubber hand study (75%) (Kalckert & Ehrsson,
2012). The factors that determine the individual differences in the illusion are not fully understood (Haans, Kaiser,
Bouwhuis, & IJsselsteijn, 2010) but may be related to differences in how different types of signals in different modalities
are weighted in the dynamic process of integration (Hagura, Hirose, Matsumura, & Naito, 2012; van Beers, Wolpert, &
Haggard, 2002). Interestingly, when looking at the number of ‘‘illusion rejecters,’’ i.e., those participants who reported
an ownership score of 1 or lower, we see that only 1 of 40 participants strongly denied the illusion in all three cases.
Thus, those who experienced the illusion in one condition were also more likely to experience the illusion in the other
conditions. Replicating the earlier observation made by Riemer and colleagues, we observed that the ownership illusion
scores in the moving and classical rubber hand illusion were highly correlated (Riemer et al., 2013). This again points to-
wards a very similar mechanism for ownership across the active movement, passive movement, and visuotactile stimula-
tion conditions.
Is it not surprising that the ownership illusion is not greater after active movements compared to visuotactile stimula-
tion? Should not information about voluntary motor commands, matching sensory predictions, and afferent feedback facil-
itate the ownership illusion, at least slightly, just as it triggers the sense of agency? Studies have shown that during active
movements, when efference copy mechanisms are engaged, the recognition of an action or body part is enhanced (Farrer,
Franck, Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003; MacDonald & Paus, 2003; Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005). For example,
Tsakiris and Haggard (2005) visually presented active or passive ﬁnger movements where the image of the hand was that of
the participant’s hand or the experimenter’s hand, and then varied the delay between the visual and somatosensory feed-
back. In the active movement condition, the presented hand was recognized more accurately than in the passive movement
condition, suggesting that efferent information enhanced self-recognition in this task. Although studies on self-recognition of
action have contributed greatly to our understanding of how we identify visually presented actions, these paradigms can
provide only indirect evidence for the moving rubber hand illusion and the role of sensory and efferent cues in this paradigm.
In most of these studies, visual feedback is manipulated by introducing a temporal delay (or spatial deviation) and the par-
ticipants are instructed to report the presence of a discrepancy. These studies on action self-recognition are best understood
in terms of sense of agency: when the temporal delay or spatial deviation exceeds a certain threshold, the participant notices
the discrepancy and feels a mismatch between the intended movement and the actual feedback (Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer,
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ing active movements, the threshold for the detection of mismatches (i.e., delayed visual feedback) is indeed lower, therefore
suggesting improved discrimination ability when efferent information is available. Although many of these studies use an
image of the participant’s real hand (i.e., Nahab et al., 2011), they do not necessarily imply or manipulate sense of ownership
over this hand nor trigger perceptual body illusions. Consequently, it is necessary to carefully distinguish between the
delayed feedback detection paradigms mentioned above and studies on agency and ownership in the context of rubber hand
illusion paradigms. We believe future studies are needed to combine these two approaches and mix the rubber hand illusion
with delayed feedback detection tasks or forced-choice action recognition paradigms under various contexts of spatiotem-
poral congruency of multisensory feedback and efferent motor signals.
If we put aside the question of a possible contribution of efferent signals, why are the ownership ratings so similar in the
moving rubber hand illusion and classical version elicited by brush-strokes? One explanation could be that in the classical
rubber hand illusion, the stimulation consists of two very distinct events in perihand space: an object seen touching the
model hand and a matching touch sensation on the real hand. Possibly, these cues could be powerful in driving the illusion
because of the important role of visuotactile integration in peripersonal space for guiding spatially precise hand action
towards external objects (Brozzoli, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2012; Makin et al., 2008). During movements, many different types
of sensory channels provide information about the ongoing ﬁnger action, and all these signals might produce a stronger illu-
sion. However, this also means that signals from many separate information channels have to be integrated: signals from
cutaneous receptors signaling skin stretch, muscle spindles, joint receptors, visual information, and, in the case of active
movements, perhaps efferent signals and sensory predictions (i.e., efference copy). All these different information channels
have to be evaluated for congruency. Thus, there are not only more channels to harvest information from but also potentially
more channels signaling the initial conﬂict between the seen and felt positions of the model hand and the real hand. There-
fore, one can speculate whether there might be a trade-off between the number of heterogeneous information channels and
fewer but more precise and information-rich sensory signals. This could explain the observation by Walsh et al. (2011) of
higher ownership ratings during anesthesia of the superﬁcial skin than in the non-anaesthetized condition when the illusion
relies purely on a match between visual and proprioceptive cues.
Finally, if one conceptualizes the rubber hand illusion as an ‘‘all or nothing’’ phenomenon, where the brain makes infer-
ences based on actual incoming sensory information, then it is not surprising to see that different types of sensory informa-
tion can yield the same result (i.e., to incorporate the rubber hand as part of the own body). Once this central process has
accumulated enough sensory evidence (meaning spatially and temporally correlated multisensory stimuli), it can make
the inference that this visually observed hand (i.e., the rubber hand) is the ‘‘own hand’’, thereby giving rise to the ownership
illusion. Importantly, a match between any two sources of sensory information that can be regarded as independent, be they
visual and tactile (in the case of the classical rubber hand illusion), or correlated sensorimotor signals (in the case of the mov-
ing rubber hand illusion) might count as important evidence in favor of this dynamic central decision process. Although this
explanation emphasizes bottom-up mechanisms in the generation of the illusion, it does not exclude top-down inﬂuences,
which set important a priori criteria for what types of objects can become part of one’s own body (Guterstam et al., 2011;
Petkova & Ehrsson, 2009; Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010).
Because we also included statements regarding the feeling of being in voluntary control over the model hand, we were
able to make some observations regarding the sense of agency. We found not only that sense of agency was strongly expe-
rienced in the active and synchronous movement condition, as one would expect (Synchronous active movement median:
2.7), but also that relatively high agency ratings were noted (Asynchronous active movement median: 1.3) in the active asyn-
chronous condition (but still signiﬁcantly lower than in the synchronous condition). A possible reason for this rather strong
explicit agreement of agency in the active asynchronous condition in this study – more so than in our previous study (Kal-
ckert & Ehrsson, 2012), see Fig. 2) – is the small changes we introduced to the agency statements in the questionnaire to
make them applicable to both the moving and classical versions of the rubber hand illusion. This adaptation meant that
the statements became slightly more general to include the feelings that the participant could move the hand if they would
like to (‘‘I felt as if I couldmovements of the rubber hand’’). Thus these observations provide a more indirect measurement of
agency, as compared to situations in which participants actually produced ﬁnger movements and could claim that they exe-
cuted these. Furthermore, the small differences in statement formulation might result in slightly higher ratings in the passive
and asynchronous condition in the present study compared to our previous one. Nevertheless, it is rather striking that par-
ticipants reported high agency of the model hand when the feedback was out-of-sync. This result suggests that voluntary
intentions (prior to a comparison between efferent copy and actual sensory feedback) play an important part in the sense
of agency (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). This ﬁnding is in line with earlier observations that participants tend to attribute ac-
tions to themselves, sometimes even in cases where a clear spatiotemporal mismatch is present (Nielsen, 1963; Preston &
Newport, 2010), which might be dependent on the speciﬁc context (Jeannerod, 2003; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008).
Therefore, when an intention is present, participants tend to experience a certain degree of agency and attribute a causal
relationship between their actions, regardless whether there is a match between the afferent sensory feedback and the ex-
pected sensory feedback or not.
Interestingly, we also noted weaker denial of agency in the passive movement and visuotactile condition when the visuo-
somatic feedback occurred synchronously compared to asynchronously. Actually, the participants reported that they were
uncertain about agency in these instances (see Fig. 2). In other words, when participants experienced the ownership illusion,
they less strongly denied agency in the synchronous passive movement and visuotactile conditions. Note that we also
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producing or experiencing a voluntary movement. Speculatively, this suggests that whenever the hand was perceived as part
of their own body, participants automatically tended to become more uncertain about the level of control they could exhibit
over the model hand (see also (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Thus, based on our results, one can formulate the interesting
hypothesis that ownership may facilitate agency over bodily actions, a notion that deserves further investigation in future
studies (Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007).5. Conclusion
Active and passive movements or visuotactile stimulation can induce an equally strong rubber hand illusion. The subjec-
tive strength of illusory ownership of the model hand does not differ even if the types of sensory stimulation and sensory
modalities involved differ. Although active movements elicited a sense of agency of the model hand and active movements
are known to engage efference copy mechanisms, median scores of ownership were very similar for the active and passive
movement conditions, questioning the role of efferent signals in the perceptual illusion of ownership. Further research is
needed to investigate the potential interactions of the sense of ownership and agency for bodily self-recognition and how
individual channels of sensory information are integrated to generate the feeling of ownership of the body.
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